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Abstract. Now that complex Agent-Based Models and computer simulations 
spread over economics and social sciences - as in most sciences of complex 
systems -, epistemological puzzles (re)emerge. We introduce new 
epistemological tools so as to show to what precise extent each author is right 
when he focuses on some empirical, instrumental or conceptual significance of 
his model or simulation. By distinguishing between models and simulations, 
between types of models, between types of computer simulations and between 
types of empiricity, section 2 gives conceptual tools to explain the rationale of 
the diverse epistemological positions presented in section 1. Finally, we claim 
that a careful attention to the real multiplicity of denotational powers of 
symbols at stake and then to the implicit routes of references operated by 
models and computer simulations is necessary to determine, in each case, the 
proper epistemic status and credibility of a given model and/or simulation. 
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Introduction: Methodical Observation versus Conceptual Analysis 
Models and empirical enquiries have often been opposed. Such an opposition between 
observational experiment and reasoning has led to classical oppositions: empirical 
sciences are seen as based on methodic observation (inquiry, experiment) whereas 
theoretical and modeling approaches are thought as founded on a conceptual or 
hypothetico-deductive approach. 
Amazingly, even if simulation is still often defined with reference to 
modeling (e.g. as a “dynamical model … that imitates a process by another process”, 
[28]), it has been more systematically compared to a kind of experiment or to an 
intermediary method between theory and experiment ([40], [50]). In agent-based 
simulation, Tesfatsion [49] talked about “computational laboratory” as a way “to 
study complex system behaviors by means of controlled and replicable experiments”, 
and Axelrod [3] claimed that simulation in social sciences is “a third way for doing 
science”, between induction and deduction.  
The first aim of this paper is to review, discuss and extend these rather 
converging positions on simulations in the case of agent-based models of simulation 
in economics and social sciences, based on MAS (multi-agent systems) software 
technology [10, 11]. In this case, as underlined by Axelrod [3], simulation begins with 
model building activity, even if analytical exploration of the model is often 
impracticable. Recently, authors have proposed to distinguish between ontology 
design and model implementation in this initial step of model engineering [7, 32]. As 
model building is an unavoidable phase of agent-based simulation, the first section is 
a review of the main epistemologies of models, with a special interest for economics 
models, taking the paradigmatic Schelling models of segregation as an example. It 
stresses some recent claims about the empirical nature of models in economics and 
social sciences. More and more authors say that models and simulations in social 
sciences - specifically as far as multi-agent models are concerned - present a shift 
from a kind of “conceptual exploration” to a new way of doing “experiments”. 
Section two recalls some of the recent puzzles about the real empiricity of such 
practices. It proposes to adapt and use the two notions of sub-symbolization [45] and 
denotational hierarchy [19] to explain further crucial differences, (1) between models 
and simulations, (2) between models and simulations of models and (3) between kinds 
of simulations. Those concepts enable to explain why multi-agent modeling and 
simulation produce new kinds of empiricity, not far from the “epistemic power” of 
ordinary experiments. They enable to understand why some authors are right to 
disagree on the epistemic status of models and simulations, especially when they do 
not agree on the denotational level of the systems of symbols they implement. 
1. Modeling and experiment  
1.1. Epistemological conceptions on scientific models 
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the term “model” has spread in the 
descriptions of scientific practices, particularly in the descriptions of the practices of 
formalization. 
Having founded their first expansion in a movement of emancipation toward 
monolithic theories in physics (such as mechanics), scientific models have first been 
explained by epistemologists through systematic comparisons to theories. 
Consequently, in the first neo-positivist epistemology, models were viewed not as 
autonomous objects, but as theoretically driven derivative instruments. Following the 
modelistic turn in mathematical logic, the semantic epistemological conception of 
scientific models persisted to emphasize on theory. For such a view, a model is a 
structure of objects and relations (more or less abstract) that is one of the possible 
interpretations of a given theory. But it stresses also the different layers (cleavage) of 
formal structures.  
More recently, models have been compared to experimental practices [12, 13, 16, 
26, 39]. For a rather similar pragmatic point of view [38], models are “autonomous 
mediators” between theories, practices and experimental data. They are built in a 
singular socio-technical context and in order to solve a specific and explicit problem 
emerging from this context. 
1.2 An open and pragmatic view: the model as a questionable construct 
Without going further in the debate between semantic and pragmatic views in 
epistemology of models, it is possible to get some insight on the weak relations 
between scientific models and theories through the general and pragmatic 
characterization of a model by Minsky [36]: 
“To an observer B, an object A* is a model of an object A to the extent that B can 
use A* to answer questions that interest him about A”. 
Minsky minimally sees a model as a questionable construct. As a construct, the 
model is an abstraction of an “object domain” formalized by means of an 
unambiguous language. Such a characterization assumes that the model A* is 
sufficient to answer the question asked by B (see [2]).  
Note that this loose characterization does not imply that the model is based on a 
relevant theory of the empirical phenomenon of the considered domain. It is 
enough to say that such a questionable construct exemplifies some definite 
“constraints on some specific operations” [31]. Therefore, in general, a scientific 
model is not an interpretation of a pre-existing theory, but a way to explore some 
properties in the virtual world of the model. In particular, according to Solow [46], 
it can serve to evaluate the explaining power of some hypothesis (constructed by 
abduction) isolated by abstraction: “the idea is to focus on one or two causal or 
conditioning factors, exclude everything else, and hope to understand how just 
these aspects of reality work and interact” (p. 43). Due to this characteristic, some 
authors have compared the model to real experiment. Let us precise further some 
of the points that models share with experiment. 
1.3 The “isolative analogy” between models and experiments 
Economists distinguish usually the abstract worlds of the models from the “real 
world” of the empirical phenomenon. This neither means that they are pure formalists 
nor that talking about a “real world” implies a metaphysical realistic commitment. 
This is just to underline the recognition of a problematic relationship between the 
abstract world of the models and the concrete empirical reality. 
For Mäki, abstractions in models are similar to abstractions in experiments as they 
both can be interpreted as a kind of isolation. Accordingly, model building can be 
viewed as a quasi-experimental activity or as the “economist’s laboratory” [33, 34, 
35]. This analogy between models and experiments is called “isolative analogy” by 
Guala [25]. From Mäki’s standpoint, a model can be said to be experimented in its 
explanatory dimension: the finality of such a model is to explore the explanatory 
power of some causal mechanism taken in isolation. Significantly, Guala is less 
optimistic than Mäki. He refuses to overlook the remaining differences between a 
model and an experiment: 
“In a simulation, one reproduces the behavior of a certain entity or system by 
means of a mechanism and/or material that is radically different in kind from that 
of a simulated entity (…) In this sense, models simulate whereas experimental 
systems do not. Theoretical models are conceptual entities, whereas experiments 
are made of the same ‘stuff’ as the target entity they are exploring and aiming at 
understanding” ([25], p.14). 
It is often by using the mediating and rather paradoxical notion of “stylized facts” 
that authors give themselves the possibility to overlook this difference in “stuff”, 
when comparing models and experiments.  
Sugden [47] suggests a slightly different approach in which two worlds are to be 
distinguished. The abstract “world of the model” is a way to evaluate through virtual 
experiments the explanatory power of some empirically selected assumptions. The 
problematic relationship between this abstract world and the real one can be 
summarized by two questions. To what extent such a virtual world can have some link 
with the “real world”? What kind of (weak) realism is at stake here? 
1.4. The scope and meaning of Schelling’s conjecture according to Sugden (2002) 
A model (in a broad meaning) can be seen as an abstract object. As such, it is 
based on a principle of parsimony. It is a conceptual simplification which stresses one 
or more conjecture(s) concerning the empirical reality. Moreover, it is built to answer 
a specific question which can have an empirical origin. In this specific case, one talks 
about empirically oriented conceptualization. 
Sugden [47] takes Schelling’s model of segregation [44] as an example. 
According to Solow [45], there is a first empirical question in every process of 
modeling: a regularity (or “stylized fact”) is previously observed in phenomenological 
material from empirical reality. In the Schelling case, it is the persistence of racial 
segregation in housing for the Schelling model of segregation. Then a conjecture is 
proposed. In this case, Schelling’s conjecture says that this phenomenon (persistent 
racial segregation in housing) could be explained by a limited set of causal factors 
(parsimony). 
According to this conjecture, a simplified model is constructed where agents 
interact only locally with their 8 direct neighbors (within a Moore neighborhood). No 
global representation about the residential structure is available to agents. The only 
rule specifies that each agent would stay in a neighborhood with up to 62% of people 
with another color. Finally, the simulation of the model shows that a slight 
perturbation is sufficient to induce local chain reactions and emergence of 
segregationist patterns. I.e., “segregation” (clusters) is observed as an emergent 
property of the model. 
This does not mean that these factors are the only possible explaining ones, neither 
that there are effectively the main causal factors for the empirical observed 
phenomenon. This empirical observation of the model only gives the right to claim 
that these factors are possible explanatory candidates. What is tested with this 
approach is nothing but “conditions of possibilities” and not directly the genuine 
presence of these conjectured factors in the empirical reality. 
In the Schelling case, (1) he observes a regularity R in the phenomenological data 
observed from the “real world” (here it is that persistent racial segregation in 
housing); (2) he conjectures that this regularity can be explained by a limited set 
(parsimony) of causal factors F (here it is the simple local preferences about 
neighborhood). 
Hence, according to Sugden [47], Schelling’s approach relies on three claims: 
(1) R occurs (or often occurs) 
(2) F operates (or often operates) 
(3) F causes R (or tends to cause it) 
Schelling doesn’t present explicitly these claims as testable hypotheses. But claims 
(1) and (2) get informal evidence from selected case studies. 
The unresolved question concerning the problematic relationship between the 
conjectural and abstract “world of the model” and the “real world” remains. Sugden 
[47] discusses different strategies to answer this question. He rejects first the 
instrumentalist view [15] which represents models as (testable) instruments with 
predicting power. For Sugden, the goal of Schelling clearly is an explanatory one. 
Contrary to the instrumentalists’ view, Schelling does not construct “any explicit and 
testable hypothesis about the real world” ([47], p.118). Sugden discusses also the 
notions of models as conceptual explorations, thought experiments and explaining 
metaphors. According to Hausman [29], all these approaches are incomplete, because 
the persistent gap between the “world of the model” and the “real world” is not filled. 
Sugden suggests filling the gap by an inductive inference: the credible world 
argument.  
In the suggested interpretation, Schelling connects first in abstracto real causes 
(segregationist preferences) to real effects (segregationist cluster emergence). 
Afterwards, instead of “testing” empirical predictions from the models, he tries to 
convince us of the credibility of the corresponding assumptions. Schelling’s 
unrealistic model is “supposed to give support to these claims about real tendencies”. 
For Sugden, this method “is not instrumentalism: it is some form of realism” ([47], 
p.118). Before going deeper in this question of “realist” credible world (sect. 1.6), let 
us discuss first the strategy of “conceptual exploration”. 
1.5. Conceptual exploration and “internal validity” 
 Following Hausman [29], we speak of the use of a model as a “conceptual 
exploration” when we put the emphasis on the internal properties of the model itself, 
without taking into account the question of the relationship between the “model 
world” and the “real world”. The study of the model’s properties is the ultimate aim 
of this approach. The relevant methods used to explore and evaluate “internally” the 
properties of the model depend on its type, and not on its relationship with the 
corresponding empirical phenomenon. 
Similarly to a test of consistency performed on a set of concepts put together in a 
form of a closed verbal argument, the properties of the model which are tested here 
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are essentially evaluated in terms of consistency. From this standpoint, the model is 
viewed as a pure conceptual construct. As Hausman [29] underlines, conceptual 
exploration can be valuable because there are numerous examples of unsuspected 
inconsistencies or unidentified properties in the existing models. 
An extension of this method enables an assessment of the robustness of the results 
of the model with respect to variations in its hypotheses (as in the studies of 
sensibility). But it is important to note that when the exploratory method is no more 
purely analytic, some scholars claim that it becomes a quasi-experimental activity. 
Following Guala [24] on this point, we can interpret all the means used by this 
approach of conceptual exploration as different efforts to validate the model in the 
sense of an internal validity: 
“Whereas internal validity is fundamentally a problem of identifying causal 
relations, external validity involves an inference to the robustness of a causal 
relation outside the narrow circumstances in which it was observed and 
established in the first instance” ([24], p. 1198-1199). 
But gradually, when analyses of robustness are more and more adopted and 
extended, the assessment process can be interpreted much more properly in terms of 
external validity. Guala sees a huge gap between internal and external validity 
because, for him, models always simulate with the aid of radically different stuffs 
from the ones of the real world. But many cases of development of conceptual 
explorations on models show that there is a more gradual and progressive shift from a 
“conceptual exploration”, strictly speaking, to a first kind of “external validation”. 
According to us, that is the reason why some scholars persist to use - with some good 
reasons - the notion of quasi-experimental activity. So, let’s go now a bit further with 
this notion of “credible worlds”. 
1.6. Models as “credible worlds” (Sugden, 2002) 
In this concern, Sugden’s approach is interesting. First, it gives more details on the 
nature of the conceptual exploration performed through a model. Second, by 
introducing the notion of “credible world”, it proposes to treat more directly the link 
between the model world and the real world. 
According to Sugden, economists “formulate credible (ceteris paribus) and 
pragmatically convenient generalizations concerning operations related to the 
appropriate causal variable”. Then, the model analyst uses deductive reasoning to 
identify what effects these factors will have under these specific hypotheses (i.e. in 
this particular isolated environment). These analyses of robustness provide reasons to 
believe that the model is not specific but could be generalized, including the original 
model as a special case.  
To that extent, the corresponding cognitive process is an inductive inference, i.e. 
an inference from the cases of already experimented models to more general model 
cases. But this mode of reasoning concerns scenarios for conceptual exploration 
which remain within the world of models. From this viewpoint, the test of robustness 
cannot really be interpreted as being on the adequacy between the world of models 
and the real world. As Sugden emphasizes, some special links between the two worlds 
still are required. 
At this point, Sugden introduces the idea that a model has to be thought as a 
“credible world”. This argument works as an inductive inference too, but an inference 
from the model world to the real world. The desirable outcome is the recognition of 
some “significant similarity” between these two worlds. For Sugden, Schelling 
constructed “imaginary cities” which are easily understandable because of their 
explicit generative mechanisms. “Such cities can be viewed as possible cities, 
together with real cities”. Through Schelling’s argument, we are invited to make the 
inductive inference that similar causal processes occur in real cities. 
The whole process can be summed up as 3 phases of an abductive process: 
(a) The modeler observes that segregation occurs in the real world, and 
makes the abduction (in a narrow sense) or conjecture that segregation (S) is 
caused by individual preferences over neighborhood structure (IPoNS). 
(b) The modeler experiments and deduces that in the model world, S is 
caused by IPoNS.  
(c) The modeler infers that there are some good reasons to believe that 
IPoNS also operates in the real world, even if it is not the only possible cause 
of S. 
That is, IPoNS is a credible candidate to explain S and then the “world of model” 
is a “possible reality” or a “parallel reality”. Sugden [47] specifies this kind of 
“realism”: “Here, the model is realistic in the same sense as a novel can be called 
realistic […] the characters and locations are imaginary, but the author has to 
convince us that they are credible” (p.131). 
Clearly, such an assessment of the “model world” is not strictly about its empirical 
testability, but more about its argumentative power. Anyway, the notions of “similar 
causal processes” and “parallel reality” can play a role in an empiricist epistemology 
of simulation. But Sugden does not give us much precision on these notions of 
“similarity” and “parallelism”. The notions of “significant similarity” and “constraint 
on the operations” of Livet [31] also could help us to go further into the evaluation of 
the empirical roles of models and simulations. 
Section 2 aims to introduce conceptual tools (such as relative iconicity) so as to 
enter in more details in what determines the epistemic status of models and computer 
simulations, hence in what determines their credibility. 
2. Models, Simulations and Kinds of Empiricity 
First of all, although they seem to remain constantly linked in practice - even in those 
simulations based on multi-models and multi-formalisms [43] -, it is necessary today to 
conceptually distinguish models from simulations and to characterize the practice of 
computer simulation (CS) apart from a central reference to a unique model. 
2.1. Models and computer simulations: some more definitions and 
characterizations 
Roughly speaking, a model still can be defined as a formal construct possessing a 
kind of unity, formal homogeneity and simplicity. These unity, simplicity and 
homogeneity are chosen so as to satisfy a specific request (prediction, explanation, 
communication, decision, etc.). 
But, concerning simulation, current definitions need now to be modified and 
somewhat generalized. Scholars, especially in physics and engineering sciences, were 
often used to say that “a simulation is a model in time”. For instance, according to 
[28]: 
“Simulations are closely related to dynamic models” [i.e. models with 
assumptions about the time-evolution of the system] ... More concretely, a 
simulation results when the equations of the underlying dynamic model are 
solved. This model is designed to imitate the time evolution of a real system. To 
put it another way, a simulation imitates a process by another process” ([28], p. 
82). 
Humphreys [30] follows Hartmann [28] on the “dynamic process”. For Parker 
(forthcoming work quoted by [56]), a simulation is: 
“A time-ordered sequence of states that serves as a representation of some other 
time-ordered sequence of states ; at each point in the former sequence, the 
simulating system’s having certain properties represents the target system’s 
having certain properties.” 
It is true that a simulation takes time as a step by step operation. It is true too that a 
modeled system interests us in particular in its temporal aspect. But it is not always 
true that the dynamic aspect of the simulation imitates the temporal aspect of the 
target system. Some CS can be said to be mimetic in their results but non-mimetic in 
their trajectory [51]. 
A partially similar distinction is evoked by [56]. In fact, we have to distinguish 
simulations of which the trajectory tends to be temporally mimetic from other 
simulations that are tricks of numerical calculus. These tricks enable to attain the 
result without following a trajectory similar to the one either of the real system, or of 
the apparent temporal (historical) aspect of the resulting pattern of the simulation. For 
instance, it is possible to simulate the growth of a botanical plant sequentially and 
branch by branch (through a non-mimetic trajectory) and not through a realistic 
parallelism, i.e. burgeon by burgeon (through a mimetic trajectory), and to obtain the 
same resulting and imitating image [51]. Thereafter, the resulting static image can be 
interpreted by the observer as a pattern which has an evident temporal (because 
historical) aspect, clearly visible from the arrangement of its branching structure. But 
this observer has no way to know whether this imitated historical aspect has been 
obtained through a really mimetic temporal approach or not. But either was a 
simulation process. 
The same remark stands for Social Sciences. If we distinguish between “historical 
genesis” and “logical genesis, the processes are not the same. The logical genesis 
progresses along an abstract / a-historic succession of steps, with no intrinsic 
temporality. 
So, depending on its kind, a simulation doesn’t have always to be founded on the 
direct imitation of the temporal aspect of the target system. It depends on what is first 
simulated or … imitated. It is a bit frustrating to see that the temporal aspect is itself 
dependent on the persistent - but vague - notion of imitation or similitude. Surely, it 
remains most of the time correct and useful to see a CS as an imitating temporal 
process originally founded on a mathematical model. It is a convenient definition 
because the notion of similitude is only alluded to. This definition remains correct 
when it suffices to analyze the relations between a classical implementation of a 
unique model and its computational instantiation on a computer (“simulation of 
model”). 
But it becomes very restrictive - and sometimes false - when we consider the 
variety of contemporary CS strategies. Today, there exist various kinds of CS of the 
same model or of different systems of submodels. As a result, in order to characterize 
a CS, are we condemned to rehabilitate the old notion of similitude which Goodman 
[20], among others, shows to be very problematic because very relativistic itself? Are 
we condemned to the classical puzzle caused - as shown again by Winsberg [56] - by 
a dualistic position assuming that there are only two types of similarities at stake in an 
experiment or a simulation: formal or material (Guala [25])? 
2.2. Subsymbols and denotational hierarchy in simulations 
In fact, following Varenne [51, 52], it is possible to give a minimal 
characterization of a CS (not a definition) referring neither to an absolute similitude 
(formal or material) nor to a dynamical model. 
First, let’s say that a simulation is minimally characterized by a strategy of 
symbolization taking the form of at least one step by step treatment. This step by step 
treatment proceeds at least in two major phases: 
1st phase: a certain amount of operations running on symbolic entities (taken as 
such) which are supposed to denote either real or fictional entities, reified rules, 
global phenomena, etc. 
2nd phase: an observation or a measure or any mathematical or computational re-
use (e.g., in CSs, the simulated “data” taken as data for a model or another 
simulation, etc.) of the result of this amount of operations taken as given through a 
visualizing display or a statistical treatment or any kind of external or internal 
evaluations. 
In analog simulations, for instance, some material properties are taken as 
symbolically denoting other material properties. In this characterization, the external 
entities are said “external” as they are external to the systems of symbols specified for 
the simulations, whether these external entities are directly observable in empirical 
reality or are fictional or are holistic constructs (such as a “rate of suicide”). 
Because of these two distinct and major phases in any simulations, the symbolic 
entities denoting the external entities can be said to be used in a classical symbolic 
way (as in any calculus), but also in a subsymbolic way. Smolensky [45] coined the 
term “subsymbol” to designate those empirical entities processing in a connectionist 
network at a lower level and which aggregation can be called a symbol at an upper 
level. They are constituents of symbols: “they participate in numerical – not symbolic 
– computation” (p.3). Berkeley [6] has recently shown that Smolensky’s notion has to 
be interpreted in regard to a larger scale and from an internal relativistic point of 
view. This relativity of symbolic power is what we want to express through our 
relativistic use of the term. 
In a simulation, the symbolic entities are denoting (sometimes through complex 
routes of reference). They are symbols as such. But, it is some global result of their 
interactions which is of interest, during the second phase. During this evaluation 
phase, they are treated at another level than the one at which they first operated. They 
were first treated as symbols, each one denoting at a certain level and through a 
precise route of reference. But they finally are treated as relative subsymbols. 
Indeed, simulation is a process, as it is often said. But it is more characteristically 
a way of partially using entities taken as symbols in a less convention-oriented 
fashion and with less combinatorial power [5], i.e. with more “independence to any 
individual language” [12], comparatively to other levels of systems of symbols. 
So, we define here a sub-symbolization as a strategy to use symbols for a partial 
“iconic modeling” [14]. Contrary to what could be said in 1961, not all simulations 
are “iconic modeling” in the sense of the iconicity images can have. But they present 
at least some level of relative iconicity. Fischer [12] defines “iconicity” as “a natural 
resemblance or analogy between a form of a sign [...] and the object or concept it 
refers to in the world or rather in our perception of the world”. She insists on the fact 
that not all iconicities are imagic and that an iconic semiotic relation is relative to the 
standpoint of the observer-interpreter. What is the most important is this property of 
an iconic relation to be - relatively to a given language or vision of the world - less 
dependent of this language. 
Let us say now that a CS is a simulation for which we delegate (at least) the first 
phase of the step by step treatment of symbolization to a digital and programmable 
computer. 
Usually, with the progress in power, in programming facilities and in visualizing 
displays, computers are used for the second phase two. At any rate, all kinds of CS 
make use of, at least, one kind of subsymbolization. 
Note that the symmetrical relations of subsymbolization and relative iconicity 
entail a representation of the mutual relations between levels of signs in a CS which is 
similar to the denotational hierarchy presented by Goodman [21]. For Goodman, 
“reference” is a general term “covering all sorts of symbolization, all cases of 
standing for”. Denotation is a kind of reference: it is the “application of a word or a 
picture or other label to one or many things”. 
There is a hierarchy of denotations: “At the bottom level are nonlabels like tables 
and null labels as ‘unicorn’ that denote nothing. A label like ‘red’ or ‘unicorn-
description’ or a family portrait, denoting something at the bottom level is at the next 
level up; and every label for a label is usually one level higher than the labeled level” 
([21], p. 127). For Goodman, an ‘unicorn-description’ is a ‘description-of-an-unicorn’ 
and not a description of an unicorn, because it is a particular denoting symbol which 
denotes nothing really existing. 
There are many kinds of denotation. Goodman [20] subsumes mathematical 
modeling and computational treatment in a kind called “notation”. Contrary to what 
happens in a system of pictorial denotation, in notations, symbols are “unambiguous 
and both syntactically and semantically distinct”. Notation must meet the 
requirements of “work-identity in every chain of correct steps from score to 
performance and performance to score”. For instance, the western system for writing 
music tends to be a notation. Many authors who assume that a kind of formal analogy 
- and nothing else - must be at stake in a CS (which they often reduce to a calculus of 
a uniform model) do implicitly agree with this reduction of CS to a system of 
notation. 
But, in fact, many simulations present a variety of notations. No unique notation 
governs them. Moreover, many CS have symbols operating without having been 
given any clear semantic differentiation (for instance, those CS which are 
computational tricks to solve a model manipulate discrete finite elements which have 
no meaning or no corresponding entities in the target system) nor stable (absolute) 
semantic during the process itself (e.g. in some multileveled complex simulations). 
Following Goodman [20] on symbols, but reversing his specific analyses on 
computational models, we can say that, in a numerical simulation of a fluid 
mechanics’ model, e.g., each operating subsymbol is a denotation-of-an-element-of-
the-fluid but not a denotation of an element of the fluid. During the course of a 
computation, the same level of symbol (from the implementer point of view) can be 
taken either as iconic or as symbolic, depending on the level at which the event or 
operation considers the actual elements. 
It is not possible to show here in details the various routes of reference that are 
used in various CS. It suffices to say that, whether a simulation or an experiment 
finally is successful or not, simulationists and experimenters first ought to have a 
representation of the denotational hierarchy and then of the remoteness of the 
references of the symbols they will use or will let use (by the computer). 
 
Figure 1: the denotational hierarchy and its relative subsymbols 
Figures 1 & 2 can help to follow instances of such routes by following successive 
arrows between levels of symbols. Figure 1 represents (1) the levels, (2) some of 
Goodman’s examples, (3) the first kind of CS we propose to insert in this hierarchical 
interpretation and (4) the types of semiotic relations between things and/or symbols 
across levels. 
Figure 2 shows the insertion of Agent-Based CS. The analysis surely can be 
refined. E.g., the place of such a CS can be expanded or changed in the hierarchy, but 
not the kinds of local relations between levels of symbols at stake. What is important 
is that the relative position between symbols is preserved. Accordingly, figure 2 
shows the correlative degrees of combinatorial power and iconicity across levels. We 
image it through a deforming black quadrilateral (which tends to possess a constant 
surface): the more important the iconic aspect of the symbol is, the less its 
combinatorial power is. 
Figure 2: Degree of combinatorial power and degree of iconicity 
In front of this new way of representing the referential relations between symbols 
in CS and between things (or facts, etc.) and symbols, we can see that Winsberg [56] 
is perfectly right when he says that the dualistic approach is too simple and puzzling. 
But he is too rapid when he directly goes back to an epistemology of deference instead 
of trying a careful and differentiating epistemology of reference. Contemporary 
epistemology of deference remains a restrictive philosophy of knowledge because it 
persists to see any symbolic construct produced by sciences - and their instruments - 
as analogue to human knowledge: i.e. as propositional, such as a belief (“S believes 
that p”). So, its ability to offer any new differentiating focuses on CS, especially 
between models and simulations and - what seems so crucial today - between kinds of 
simulations, sounds very doubtful. 
The puzzle concerning the empirical or conceptual status of CSs largely stems 
from this large and simplistic reduction of any CS to a notation and, through that, to a 
formal language always instantiating some “propositions” analogous to “musical 
sentences” performed through a unique system of notation. 
Our characterization gives the possibility to stay at the level of the symbols a 
stake, and not to jump prematurely to propositions, this without going back to a naïve 
vision of an absolute iconicity of simulations. Iconicity does not entail absolute 
similitude nor materiality. It is a relativistic term. E.g., in cognitive economics [53, 
54], agent-based simulations can be said to operate on some iconic signs because they 
denote directly – term to term, so with a weak dependence on linguistic conventions - 
some credible rule of reasoning. 
2.3. Three kinds of Computer Simulations 
Following this characterization, it is possible to go further and distinguish at least 
three kinds of CS depending on the kinds of subsymbolization at stake: 
1- a CS is model-driven (or numerical) when it proceeds from a subsymbolization of 
a given model. That is: the model is treated through a discrete system which still 
can be seen as a system of notation. 
2- a CS is rule-driven (or algorithmic) when it does not proceed from the 
subsymbolization of a previous mathematical model. Rules are now constitutive. 
The rules of the algorithm are subsymbolic regarding some hypothetical algebraic 
or analytical mathematical model and they are iconic regarding (relatively to) the 
formal hypotheses implemented (e.g. “stylized facts”). Hence, from the point of 
view of the user, an iconic aspect still appears in such a simulation. And this 
iconicity serves as another argument to speak about experiment in another sense. 
As underlined by Sugden it is precisely the case of Schelling’s model: causal 
mechanisms are denoted through partial and relative iconic symbols. Those 
elementary mechanisms - which are elementary denoted in the CS - are what is 
“empirically” assessed here. It is empirical to the extent that there is no theory of 
the mass-behavior of such distributed mechanisms. So, the symbols denoting this 
mechanism operate in a poor symbolic manner: they have a weak combinatorial 
power, and a weak ability to be directly condensed and abridged in a symbolic 
manner. Experience (passive strategy of observation) is convoked there, rather 
than experiment (an interactive strategy of interrogation and observation). 
3- a CS is object-driven (or software-based) when it first proceeds not from a given 
uniform formalism (either mathematical or logical) but from various kinds and 
levels of denoting symbols which symbolicity and iconicity are internally relative 
and depend on internal relations between these kinds and levels. Most of the time 
(but not necessarily), such simulations are based on multi-agents systems 
implemented by agent- / object-oriented programming so as to enable the 
representation of various degrees of relative reifications - or, conversely, relative 
formalizations - of objects and relations. 
Concerning the first kind, the focus is on the model. Then scholars are willing to 
say that they are computing the model, or, at most, that they are experimenting on the 
model. We have seen that a symbol-denoting-an-element-of-the-fluid is not 
necessarily a symbol denoting anything. It can be a null-label which nevertheless 
possesses some residual (weak) combinatorial power which can be worked upon once 
placed in the conditions of some machine delegated computational iterations (CS). 
In the case of algorithmic CS, scholars often say that their list of rules is a “model 
of simulation” and that they make with it a “simulation experiment”. They say that 
because the iconicity of the subsymbols is directly linked to a familiar level of 
empiricaly oriented consideration of the system. 
The recent emergence of complex multidisciplinary and/or multi-levelled CS has 
given rise to mix CS: some of their operations are considered as calculus of models, 
whereas some others are algorithmic and not far from being iconic to some extent, 
while others are only exploitations of digitalizations of scenes (such as CS coupled to 
Geographic Information Systems). 
From this standpoint, a software-based simulation of a complex system often is a 
simulation of interacting pluri-formalized models. The technical usefulness of such a 
CS is new [51]. It relies no more on the practical calculability of one intractable 
model but on the co-calculability of heterogeneous - from an axiomatic point of view 
- models. E.g.: CS in “artificial life”, CS in computational ecology, CS in post-
genomic developmental biology, CS of interrelated process in multi-models, multi-
perspective CS… 
2.4. Types of empiricity for Computer Simulations 
Varenne [51] has shown that 4 criteria of empiricity, at least, can be used for a CS 
according to this characterization. 
1- when focusing on a partial or global result of the CS to see some kind of similarity 
of this result (this similarity being interpreted in terms of relative iconicity, formal 
analogy, exemplification or identity of features), and when the result is found to 
denote some target system, we can speak of an empiricity of the CS regarding the 
effects. The focus relies here on the second phase of the simulation. Once seen 
from the global results, the elementary symbols - which first operated - are 
overlooked and treated as subsymbols. 
2- when focusing on the partial iconic aspects of some of the various types of 
elementary symbols operating in the computation, we can speak of some 
empiricity of the CS regarding the causes. The focus relies here on the first phase 
of the CS and on the supposed realism or credibility of these elements with 
respects to the target system. 
Both of these dimensions of empiricity have been evoked by Galison [17] in the 
case of numerical simulations, but not the two others to come. Both concern the 
external validity of the simulation in the sense of Guala. Note that they are similar to 
that kind of non interactive experiment called “experience” for which observation 
suffices. 
3- when focusing on the intrication of levels of denotations operating in a complex 
pluriformalized CS, it is possible to decide that there is an intellectual opacity 
different in nature from the one coming from a classical intractability. We can 
speak then of an empiricity regarding the intrication of the referential routes. 
Such an empiricity (as the 4th) does not come from the existence of a rather 
passively experienced level of symbols as in (1) or (2). But it comes from an 
active comparison between different iterative intrications of levels of symbol, be 
they controlled (semantically or instrumentally) or uncontrolled factors in this 
virtual experiment. 
 
4- when focusing on the intrication of the resulting epistemic status of such a 
complex CS with levels of models and then levels of denotational systems, a 4th 
kind of empiricity comes to view. It is a problem because not only each of its level 
has its own form, that is, its own alphabet and rules of (weak or strong) 
combination, but each one has a different denotational level or position in the 
hierarchy too. So, each one can entail for itself a different route back to reference. 
Each one can have a different epistemic status in that it belongs to a different 
“world” [22], the one being fictional, the other descriptive, the other explanative. 
We can speak here of an empiricity regarding the defect of any a priori epistemic 
status. That is: the CS has to be treated - first and a minima - as an experiment 
because we do not know a priori if it is an experiment for any of the 3 other 
reasons, or a theoretical argument, or only a conceptual exploration. Moreover, it 
is probable that there exists no general composition law of epistemic statuses for 
some of such complex CS and that they demand a case-by-case epistemological 
investigation, with the help of careful denotational analyses. 
2.5. Models, simulations and kinds of experiment 
Now that we have gained some conceptual tools, let’s rapidly but accordingly 
reinterpret some of the different epistemological positions we first put into 
perspective in sect. 1. 
How and to what extent models can be seen as some kind of experiment? 
Facing some cases, like Schelling’s model discussed by Sugden, we can say that a 
model has an empirical dimension in itself because some causal factors are denoted 
through symbols of which partial iconicity is patent and can be reasonably 
recognized as a sufficiently “realistic” conjecture in the argumentative approach of 
the “credible world”. 
On the contrary, models are seen from an instrumentalist standpoint when the 
level of iconicity of their symbols is weak (the remoteness of reference is important) 
and when this is their combinatorial power at a high level in the denotational 
hierarchy which is requested (i.e. Friedman’s unrealism of assumption argument). 
Retrospectively, such an epistemology can be seen as a contingent rationalization of 
some limited mono-leveled formalizations (which were the only one available in the 
past) in contrast to the current more complex and developed abilities to vary routes of 
reference through ABM and computer-aided simulations. 
The notion of “stylized fact” is ambiguous in this concern because it can serve to 
put the emphasis either on the stylization, or on the factuality and then on the eventual 
iconicity of the used symbolization. The fact is that, independently of an explicit 
commitment toward a denotational hierarchy, models of “stylized facts” cannot be 
said a priori to be “conceptual exploration” or “experiments”. 
How and why can a CS be seen as an experiment on a model? 
As a CS entails some kind of subsymbolization, every CS of a model treats a 
model at a sublevel which tends to make its relation to the model analogous to the 
naïve dualistic relation between the formal constructs and the concrete reality. 
Because of this analogy of relations between two levels of different denotational 
authority (no matter what these levels are), such a CS can be said to be an experiment 
on the model. But if we focus on some symbolic aspects of used subsymbols, we can 
speak of such a CS of model as a conceptual exploration. 
It follows that the external validity is a matter of degree and depends on the 
strength of the alleged iconic aspects. If this iconic aspect is extremely stabilized and 
characterized, the simulation can even be compared to an exemplification. In this case, 
external validity is not far from an internal one. 
To what extent a CS can be seen as an experiment in itself? 
There are at least 4 criteria to decide whether a simulation is not only an 
experiment on the model but an experiment in itself. A CS can first lend its empiricity 
from an experiencing, that is, from a comparison with the target (external validity): 
and those are (1) the empiricity regarding the causes (of the computation) and (2) the 
empiricity regarding the effects (of the computation). But its empiricity can be 
decided not from an experiencing of a more or less direct route of reference but from 
a real experimenting on the interaction between levels of symbols, i.e. with controlled 
and uncontrolled changing factors: and here are (1) the empiricity regarding the 
intrication of the referential routes, and (2) the empiricity regarding the defect of any 
a priori epistemic status. 
From this standpoint, through this particular experimenting dimension, software-
based CS gain some particular kind of empiricity which gives them a similar 
epistemic power (pace Morgan) than ordinary experiments. 
Conclusion  
The coming years will see the expansion of more empirically based CS with agents 
in social sciences (as in all the sciences of complex systems), and of multidisciplinary 
CS, especially between social sciences and biology or ecology. Due to differences in 
methodological habits, epistemological misunderstandings between disciplines will 
probably increase. So, we think that careful attention to the multiplicity of standpoints 
on symbols, on their mutual relations and on the implicit routes of references operated 
through them by computations will help to discern more precisely the denotational 
power, hence the epistemic status and credibility of such complex models and 
simulations. In this concern, this paper has presented a first outline of conceptual and 
applicative developments in the domain of an applied, referentialist but multi-level 
centered epistemology of complex models and simulations. 
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